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1. Introduction 
    Kazakhstan was formed as an autonomous Republic within the Russian Federation in August 1920 and 
became a Republic of the Soviet Union in 1936. In 1989 Nursultan Nazarbayev became head of the 
Communist Party of Kazakhstan. The Supreme Soviet elected Nazarbayev first Kazakh president in 1990 
and declared state sovereignty. In December 1991 Nazarbayev won uncontested presidential elections (98% 
of the vote) and Kazakhstan declared its independence from the Soviet Union and joined the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In 1995 the President’s term of office was extended until 
2000 at a nation-wide referendum and in January 1999, in an early election, he was returned for a seven 
year term by almost 80% of voters. The most recent Presidential elections were held in December 2005 
when Nazarbayev won a third term with more than 90% of the vote. The people of Kazakhstan have to live 
with the aftermath of Soviet-era nuclear testing and toxic waste dumping. President Nazarbayev got rid of 
the nuclear weapons on Kazakh territory and sees his greatest achievement as building an independent 
country without violence or a split along ethnic or religious lines. He has also led a period of significant 
financial and economic reforms (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2007).  
Following independence, Kazakhstan engaged in a programme of economic reforms where prices were 
liberalized, trade distortions reduced, and small/medium-scale enterprises (SMEs) privatised. The treasury 
and budget processes were dramatically improved. More recently, a framework for public resource 
management was introduced which lays the foundation for a modern civil service. The creation of a 
National Fund (in 2000) to save part of the revenues from oil and other extractive industries has been used 
to increase social spending and share the benefits of economic growth. Since 2000 the economy has shown 
significant signs of improvement with GDP annual growth in 2006 at 10.6% (World Bank, 2006). The 
government is attempting to promote economic diversification and growth in the non-oil sector. 
Diversification into labour-intensive sectors is necessary for growth in employment and incomes, as well as 
to reduce the economy’s vulnerability to swings in the price of oil. 
It is against this political and economic background that we consider politico-administrative patterns in 
Kazakhstan by examining the actors, structures and processes supporting the administration of the Office of 
President of Kazakhstan.  
2. Background: Presidential Republic 
Kazakhstan is a presidential republic initially modeled on the Constitution of the French Republic (1958) in 
which the principal roles of the President are defined as follows: the President of the (French) Republic 
shall see that the Constitution is observed. He (sic) shall ensure, by his arbitration, the proper functioning of 
the public authorities and the continuity of the State. He shall be the guarantor of national independence, 
territorial integrity and observance of treaties (French Constitution, 4
th
 October, 1958: article 5).  
Heywood (1997) defines presidential government in the following way. A presidential system of 
government is characterised by a constitutional and political separation of powers between the legislative 
and executive branches of government. Executive power is thus vested in an independently elected 
president who is not directly accountable to or removable by the assembly. 
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The principal features of a presidential system of government are the following: 
 
 The executive and the legislature are separately elected, and each is invested with a range of 
independent constitutional powers. 
 The roles of head of state and head of government (the chief executive) are combined in the office 
of the presidency. 
 Executive authority is concentrated in the hands of the president; the cabinet and ministers being 
merely advisers responsible to the president. 
 There is a formal separation of the personnel of the legislative and the executive branches 
 Electoral terms are fixed. The president can neither ‘dissolve’ the legislature nor be dismissed by it 
(except through impeachment).   
Unlike other CIS countries, Kazakhstan favoured a presidential system of government as a necessary 
response to the economic and political crises which accompanied the collapse of the USSR. A presidential 
system provided the authority and leadership to tackle economic reforms as a priority and with urgency 
needed to address the Soviet legacy. It was seen as a pragmatic approach to a crisis which demanded 
immediate and decisive actions. A limited process of change in the system of government had begun before 
independence with modifications to the Constitution of Kazakhstan Soviet Socialist Republic proposed by 
the Supreme Soviet (the Soviet Union’s standing parliament). A law entitled ‘About the Establishment of 
the Post of President’ (April 1990) was intended to pave the way for the national election of a President but 
the Supreme Soviet proved slow and ineffective in making the necessary transformation. The Declaration 
on State Independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 1991 was a legal, political and ideological turning 
point in the history of Kazakhstan and established the status of the President as head of state and the 
supreme executive and administrative authority (Ertysbaev, 2001). The presidential elections followed in 
the same year. Such was the potential for an imminent national crisis that little attention was paid to the 
formal separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary, and associated checks and 
balances. Executive power dominated through an independently elected President. In the period 
immediately following the elections, the old state structure of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic 
remained, with the Soviet-communist system of councils in place. It quickly became clear that there was a 
need for change, in particular a new constitution was required. 
A group of international and local legal experts worked on a draft constitution aimed at incorporating broad 
democratic principles, whilst recognising the political and economic realities of Kazakhstan at that time. 
This included the need to replace the old Soviet-era parliament, an unwieldy part-time institution which 
met in full session only twice a year and lacked experience as effective legislators. The whole Communist 
system of ‘representative’ bodies from the federal to the local levels required radical reform and had 
become an obstacle to progress. Proposals for reform encountered resistance from some deputies but in 
December 1993 a majority voted to disband themselves, dissolve all the local councils or soviets and hand 
over management of the regions to local executive authorities. In the same year the first Constitution of 
Sovereign Kazakhstan was adopted which promoted the formal separation of powers, with the President 
setting national policy priorities. The executive and judicial bodies were defined for the first time as 
independent branches of government and the Supreme Commission established as the representative 
legislative body of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The first elections took place to a single chamber 
parliament in March 1994 with about 700 people from various political parties or social movements 
competing for 135 seats and an additional 42 seats elected directly from the regions (two from each region). 
However, Kazakhstan’s first parliament also appeared unable to react quickly to unfolding events best 
characterised by contradictions between an emerging period of liberal free-market reforms and the legacies 
of a command style economy.   
Faced with opposition surrounding the pace and extent of economic reforms, work began, with assistance 
of international experts from UK, France and the USA, on the creation of a new constitution aimed at 
creating the foundations for a strong, independent state. The form of governance was deliberately 
presidential, although an important role was also given to a new bicameral parliament. The new 
Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan was approved through a national referendum in August 1995 
and paved the way for parliamentary elections. Parliament was defined as the supreme representative body 
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with responsibility for legislative functions. The lower house of parliament or Majilis comprised (at that 
point) 67 directly elected members and the upper house or Senate, 47 senators
3
. New constitutional laws 
were adopted to firmly embed the presidential republic and the respective roles of its key stakeholders: 
About the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan; About the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan; 
and About the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan (1995). The President as Head of State appoints 
the Prime Minister (currently Karim Massimov since January 2007) with the approval of Parliament. The 
President also has the right to appoint 7 members of the Senate. Executive power is therefore represented 
by the President who forms the government and names regional akims (governors).  
In order to limit presidential powers and exercise ‘checks and balances’, the President does not have the 
automatic right to initiate legislation. Parliament could award him special law-making powers for up to one 
year by a two-thirds majority at a joint session. Another safeguard was that the President could be 
impeached by a three-quarters majority of a joint session of Parliament. In addition, local councils or 
Maslikhats have the right to stage a no confidence vote (two-thirds required) in any executive head whether 
at the district, town or regional level. In such cases, the President must automatically remove the official 
from his or her post. Further controls are available through the strict separation of powers between the 
legislature, executive and judiciary whereby if any of them infringe the constitution they can be held to 
account for their actions. The new constitution also established a six-member Constitutional Council, 
replacing the old Constitutional Court, with two members appointed by the President, and two each from 
the Majilis and Senate. This allowed the Council to be above politics, independent and free from outside 
pressure. In short, the new Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan (1995) has cemented the transition 
to the presidential system, and strengthened the Executive’s authority at a time when strong leadership was 
needed to achieve economic reforms and movement to a market economy. 
3. Stages of development 
The period of 1991 – 1995, from independence until the adoption of new Constitution, can therefore be 
characterized as the first stage in the formation of Kazakhstan’s statehood. Tentative steps were taken 
towards political pluralism and minor democratic changes emerged. The overriding emphasis was to tackle 
economic recession and build a solid foundation for recovery by exploiting the country’s considerable 
mineral wealth. During this period, power and authority was concentrated in the hands of the President and 
executive authorities. The reason for such an approach was that political development and reform could not 
take place without a stable economy and good inter-ethnic relations – the so called ‘first economy, and then 
politics’ era. President Nazarbayev argued that evidence has shown only when gross domestic product per 
capita is greater than US$6,000 can democracy become viable. Kazakhstan is fast approaching this level – 
in 2006 its GDP per capita was US$ 5,083 and forecast to be US$ 6,500 in 2007 (Nazarbayev, 2007a). 
The second stage in Kazakhstan’s development was the period of 1995 – 2000 which witnessed not only 
significant economic transformation but also political improvements. The new Constitution provided for a 
democratic, secular state and a presidential system of government. During this period the socio-economic 
strategy document Kazakhstan 2030: Prosperity, Security and Improvement of Welfare for Kazakhstan 
Citizens was launched (1997) and became the template or master plan for progress towards a market 
economy. With an improving economy and political stability, international investors provided capital for 
the development of local industry resulting in an emerging middle class. An environment was evolving 
conducive to political pluralism, regular elections, a growing civil society and some diversity in the mass 
media. 
The most recent phase in the country’s development from 2001 onwards has consolidated Kazakhstan’s 
strong economic performance as a regional leader – GDP is expected to double between 2000 and 2008. 
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With the economy performing well, attention shifted to democratic reform aimed at improving public 
services, increased accountability, and transparency of executive bodies. A State Commission for the 
‘Development of Democratic Reforms’ was established in March 2006 under the chair of the President and 
committed itself to a political reform agenda, the objectives of which were: 
 To make the liberal and democratic reforms in Kazakhstan systematic and irreversible by 
mobilizing the efforts of the Government and civil society institutions. 
 To ensure that the majority of the population embraces and adopts democratic traditions with a 
view to establishing a society of a ‘consolidated democracy’, and to strengthen the social base of 
the reforms. 
 To achieve political reforms that represent a compromise among all the forces of society who have 
joined together to meet the challenges facing them (Abdykarimov, 2006).  
To date the State Commission has implemented a number of initiatives to enhance the political process in 
Kazakhstan: one third of the governors are elected in districts and regional centres instead of being 
appointed; a strategic framework for the development of civil society (covering the period of 2006 – 2011) 
has been formulated and approved; and the Commission has made a significant contribution to drafting the 
law on local self-government. Importantly, the State Commission prepared constitutional proposals on 
further political development. These included ideas to strengthen the authority of Parliament and other 
representative bodies, the promotion of local self-government, strengthening judicial and law-enforcement 
systems, developing civil society and political parties, and amending the Constitution in order to provide a 
legal base for effective democratisation.  
4. The Presidential Office 
The separation of powers under the 1995 Constitution, with the strengthening the presidential system, 
demanded a more enhanced Presidential Office to deal with the different branches of government in the 
implementation of a unified state policy. As a consequence, the Administration of the President of 
Kazakhstan was formed in October 1995, a state authority directly subordinated and accountable to the 
President. The principal functions of the Office are to: 
 Develop and implement social and economic strategic policies for the development of Kazakhstan. 
Constantly review ways in which social and economic reforms can be updated to improve the 
quality of life for the citizens of Kazakhstan. 
 Support the activities of the President as Head of State by implementing his decisions and 
ensuring effective outcomes. The Administration also briefs him about current local and world 
affairs. 
 Provide support to advisory and consultative authorities under the Head of State such as: the 
Security Council; Council of Foreign Investors; Council on Legal Policies; National Fund 
Council; the Supreme Judicial Council of Kazakhstan; National Council; Social Council on Mass-
Media; and the Entrepreneurs’ Council. 
 Prepare the annual message of the President to the people of Kazakhstan on the current situation in 
the country, its internal and foreign policies, and future social and economic prospects.  
These are significant tasks and require a sizable workforce. The current Administration of the President 
derives its authority from an updated presidential decree (Decree of the President of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, 31
st
 March 2004, No. 1327).  There are 376 staff in post, 74 of whom are political appointees 
and the remainder administrative state posts. The Administration has a complex structure including various 
departments, centres and councils (Majlybaev, 2001). There are 3 key personnel in the Administration of 
the President – the State Secretary, Head of Administration, and Security Council Secretary.  
The State Secretary (currently Kanat Belmurzaevich Saudabayev) is appointed (and discharged) from the 
post by the President. He provides policy advice to the President on social and regional development and 
their implementation. He represents the President in any communications with state institutions, political 
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parties and other public bodies or associations. He also coordinates the activities of consultative bodies 
under the Head of State such as: the National Council, Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, Human 
Rights Commission, and the Committee on Corruption, and Public Service Ethics. He oversees the 
implementation of Presidential acts and orders. 
The Head of the Administration (currently Adilbek Ryskeldinovich Dzhaksybekov) coordinates the work 
of the assistants and advisers to the Head of State and recommends the appointment of officials within the 
Administration to the President. He also oversees contacts between the Administration and Parliament, the 
Government and Prime Minister’s Office, ministries, the Constitutional Council, Supreme Court and other 
central executive bodies. He submits laws adopted by Parliament, draft decrees, orders and other 
documents to the President for consideration and his signature. Of particular note, the Office of the 
President (or Chancellery of the President) resides within a division overseen by the Head of the 
Administration. This Office offers administrative and research support to the President, including arranging 
his daily operational schedule and civic events involving his participation. The Office is also monitoring 
the activities of state bodies or public officials who are responsible for implementation of political 
decisions. 
The Security Council Secretary (currently Berik Mazhitovich Imashev) is responsible for the performance 
of the Security Council whose key roles are: to guard the national interests, highlight threats to national 
safety, and agree ways of protecting the national security of Kazakhstan. The Council ensures the 
protection of national sovereignty, independence and the territorial integrity of the state. It is also charged 
with maintaining social and political stability and guaranteeing the constitutional rights and freedoms of the 
citizens of Kazakhstan. The President is the Chairman of the Security Council. An important subdivision of 
the Security Council is the Situational Centre which advises the Head of State through information and 
analysis on local and world events and their potential impact on the internal and foreign policies of 
Kazakhstan. 
The Administration of the President operates within a triad also involving the Cabinet of Ministers and the 
Security Council. Ministers exercise considerable autonomy over social and economic matters and hence 
are influential in the policy making process. The Security Council, chaired by the President, has more 
recently emerged as an organisation monitoring the state machinery and purging corrupt officials. Whilst 
the Administration of the President, Council of Ministers and Security Council represent the key formal 
actors in ‘administering the summit’, there are signs that their role in policy making and ‘speaking the truth 
to power’ is being becoming less exclusive (Guy Peters, Rhodes and Wright, 2000). The importance of the 
role played by the State Commission on the Development of Democratic Reforms is a case in point.  Given 
the centrality of this Commission to the future political reform agenda of Kazakhstan, it might have been 
expected to have drawn on established elites. In fact, whilst chaired by the President, its membership 
comprised speakers from both chambers of Parliament, leaders of registered political parties and public 
associations, members of parliament, government representatives and public figures. The Commission 
undertook its work in a widely consultative way arriving at a public consensus on the political 
modernisation agenda. The Secretary of State, Mr. Abdykarimov (2006), described the process as ‘leading 
the national dialogue on the problem of reforming our country’s political system’. Amendments to 
Kazakhstan’s constitution were required to implement the fundamental nature of the reforms emanating 
from the Commission.  
To take forward the work of the Commission, an ad hoc working group chaired by the President was set up 
to consider the significant democratic reforms proposed. These included decentralisation and the 
development of local self-governance, more widespread application of the principle of election such as in 
top local government posts, granting greater powers to Parliament and local representative bodies, more 
active participation of the political parties, development of civil society institutions, and combating 
corruption. Here again the diversity of this working group signaled a shift in elite decision making. It 
comprised government officials, members of parliament, scientists, and legal experts in constitutional law. 
The significance of this group was outlined by the President when he said that the task of the ad hoc group 
was ‘to study and summarise suggestions made by the State Commission, weigh their legal merits and 
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clearly formulate amendments to the country’s Constitution. The quality of your work will largely 
determine the success of political transformations in Kazakhstan’ (Nazarbayev, 2007b).  
The formal structures and processes of ‘administering the summit’ do not of course reflect the existence of 
a political elite in Kazakhstan which, like other post-Soviet countries tends to be personalised. Political 
elitism is compounded by the fact that Kazakh opposition parties are in disarray and fractured, offering no 
real alternative to the voting public. The President’s policy has allowed him to continuously increase his 
popularity by providing substantial increases in pension benefits and civil service salaries. In the 
President’s annual address (28th February 2007) he announced a doubling of childcare benefits and raised 
the basic pension, increasing its level to 40% of the minimum cost of living. From January 2007 salaries of 
civil and public servants have increased by 30%.  The changes suggested under the Constitution could be 
seen as part of the preparations for further political reforms. The President has said ‘it’s time we laid a legal 
basis to ensure the success of the liberal reforms that we have begun, to switch to a new balance of state 
and public interests, a new system of checks and balances’ (Nazarbayev, 2007c).  
5. From Presidential to Presidential-Parliamentary Republic? 
In May 2007 the two chambers of Parliament unanimously endorsed the proposals emerging from the State 
Commission on Democratic Reforms, its ad hoc working group, and the associated amendments to 
Kazakhstan’s Constitution. The changes were signed into law by President Nazarbayev. Therein the State 
Commission supported the preservation of the presidential form of government but backed a redistribution 
of powers and responsibilities in favour of an enhanced role for Parliament. These changes imply a shift 
from a ‘presidential’ to a ‘presidential-parliamentary’ republic by increasing the legislature’s role. 
Importantly, the amended Constitution places a two-term limit on presidents with each term being reduced 
from seven years to five. President Nazarbayev is exempt from this change ‘in recognition of the historic 
role the first president has played in the establishment of our state, as one of the founders of our new 
independent Kazakhstan’ (Zhumabayev, 2007). In effect, this permits Nazarbayev to be re-elected – his 
current tenure is due to end in 2012. The President will, under the changes, need to seek Parliament’s 
endorsement for his choice of Prime Minister. The role of the courts is enhanced. The package also 
increased the number of members in Parliament and provided for more seats in the lower house (Majilis) to 
be filled according to the proportion of votes won by political parties
4
. The Deputies will also have a 
greater say in picking regional governors (akims) who will see their terms reduced from five to four years. 
Constitutional changes increase the role of the Assembly of the People, a unique instrument to preserve the 
religious and ethnic peace and mutual tolerance of Kazakhstan’s multi-ethnic and multi-confessional 
society. See structure of government following the constitutional reforms (appendix 1). 
Opposition parties question whether the reforms represent a real shift in power. Strengthening Parliament 
poses little risk to the President and could be a way of retaining political influence after he steps down, 
according to his critics. Supporters of the constitutional reforms could refute this criticism and argue that 
both chambers of parliament have been strengthened in an evolutionary process to a presidential-
parliamentary form of governance. Given that there was no nation state until 15 years ago and no tradition 
of formal democracy until 1992, Kazakhstan is undergoing significant modernization. Advocates argue, the 
retention of a strong centralised power base in the President is necessary for Kazakhstan at this stage in the 
democratization process. They point to comparisons with neighbouring Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian 
Republics and the Ukraine and Georgia to illustrate the point. 
In an effort to legitimize the constitutional changes and following proposals by some members of 
Parliament, the President called for an early dissolution of Parliament ahead of the official end of its 
legislative term in 2009 and elections took place in on 18
th
 August 2007. Party candidates were voted in via 
a system of proportional representation with 98 Majilis seats to be shared out by those parties which could 
win more than 7% of votes. The remaining nine seats were reserved for representatives of the Assembly of 
the People of Kazakhstan. The outcome of the elections was perhaps predictable. The  People’s Democratic 
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party Nur-Otan won a landslide 88% of the vote in the parliamentary elections, leaving the opposition with 
no seats. Neither the Social Democratic Party or its moderate rival Ak-Zhol surpassed a 7% threshold for 
gaining seats, with 4.6% and 3.3% of the votes respectively (the Kazak opposition had previously held a 
single seat in Parliament). Nur Otan holds all 98 seats which were up for election. The OSCE report on the 
elections ‘welcomed progress’ over previous elections, while saying ‘a number of international standards 
were not met’. Consiglio Di Nino, a Canadian senator who led the OSCE’s monitoring team commented: 
‘notwithstanding the concerns contained in the OSCE report, I believe that these elections continue to move 
Kazakstan forward in its evolution towards a democratic country’ (Di Nino, 2007). 
Have the constitutional reforms and parliamentary elections significantly altered the power base of the 
President? Critics will now argue that the elimination of all opposition forces from the lower chamber has 
subverted the improvements to increase Parliament’s power in the amended constitution. One key element 
of the reforms was the right granted to the lower house to have greater oversight in the selection of the 
Prime Minister. The President will continue to pick the Prime Minister, subject to parliamentary approval, 
but the new rules require the Head of State to first consult the parliamentary faction leaders. The lower 
house now has greater budgetary oversight. The Prime Minister is obliged to report on budgetary 
implementation to the chamber, and a vote against the budget would be tantamount to a vote of no 
confidence in the government. This is highly unlikely in a parliament comprising the president’s 
supporters. This analysis has been rejected on the grounds that Kazakhstan will develop in its own way in 
accordance with ‘the Kazakhstan way of political transition. One of the features of our way is the 
preservation of the presidential form of government, phased introduction of reforms, balance in decisions, 
and national dialogue among and between the main political forces’ (Nazarbayev, 2007c).  
One way of trying to capture whether such constitutional changes do in fact represent a significant shift in 
governance arrangements in Kazakhstan is by considering data collected by the World Bank. ‘Worldwide 
governance indicators’ report aggregate and individual governance indicators for 212 countries along six 
dimensions of governance: voice and accountability; political stability and the absence of violence; 
government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi, 2007). The aggregate indicators combine the views of a large number of enterprise, citizen and 
expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. The individual data underlying the 
aggregate indicators are drawn from a diverse variety of survey institutes, think tanks, non-government 
organisations, and international organisations. We consider the indicator ‘voice and accountability’ here. 
Voice and accountability measures the extent to which countries’ citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. Drawing on 
the most recent data (2006) we present voice and accountability measures for Kazakhstan’s government by 
comparison to its nearest CIS neighbours: Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.  
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Figure 1: Voice and Accountability
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Figure 1 shows the percentile rank of each of the six selected CIS countries measured in terms of one 
dimension of governance as defined by the World Bank, that of ‘voice and accountability’. Percentile rank 
indicates the percentage of countries worldwide that rate below these countries. Higher values indicate 
better voice and accountability arrangements. The more important observation here is the relative position 
of Kazakhstan to its nearest CIS neighbours which ranks third (19.7) after Kyrgyzstan and Russia at 27.9 
and 24 respectively. Hence the government’s record on voice and accountability exemplifies the strength of 
a centralised presidential or presidential parliamentary republic. Tracking changes to these data following 
the 2007 constitutional reforms in Kazakhstan should allow an assessment of their impact. 
6. Conclusions 
Kazakhstan has drawn comparisons between its form of governance as a Presidential Republic and that of 
France’s Fifth French Republic. In Kazakhstan power is concentrated in an executive presidency. The 
Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers were appointed by the President. He must now seek 
parliamentary approval for his choices. The 1995 constitution gave the President wide powers, such as the 
ability to dissolve the two-chamber parliament if the president’s nominee for prime minister was rejected 
twice, or a vote of no-confidence was held. Moreover, only the President could initiate constitutional 
amendments, call referenda at his discretion, and appoint administrative heads of regions. Amendments to 
the Constitution in 2007 sought to alter the balance of power in favour of a stronger legislature. In France it 
has been argued that presidential power varies according to political circumstance and the personality of the 
head of state. It is acknowledged that the French president is a major political actor but ‘dependent on the 
parliamentary majority for political authority and on the prime minister for general administrative support’ 
(Elgie, 2000: 242). In Kazakhstan with a very weak political opposition base, power remains highly 
concentrated at the centre. The Administration of the President, Cabinet of Ministers and the Security 
Council are the key power agents. Kazakhstan has come a long way since independence in 1991. Its 
significant economic success and rise in living standards owes much to the strong leadership of the 
President. Whether the political reform agenda is sufficient to satisfy the aims of the Strategy-2030 and the 
demands of the international community remains to be seen.  
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APPENDIX 1 
STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT IN KAZAKHSTAN
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System of government in the Republic of Kazakhstan, according to the renewed Constitution 
(Law of Republic of Kazakhstan, 25
th
 May 2007, N254-III) 
 
      Kazakhstan is unitary state with the presidential form of board   
  
 
                
                 
                     
     Nominates PM’s post         
    
              M      
                  
 
 
 
           
        
 
 
 
 
 
2 deputies     9 from the  
from regions  Assembly of People          
           Nominates to  
           Akim’s post 
 
 
 
         
 
    Agrees candidates 
       
        
  Elections           Elections    Elections     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Administration 
of the President 
  
  President & Head of State,
  Chief Commander of the Army  
   
Forms Executive 
  
 Parliament 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
   
  Government 
Constitutional  
Council  
(7 members) 
Supreme 
Court 
Office of 
Public     
Prosecutor
  
    Senate   
(47 members)  
    Maslikhat 
    
Prime-Minister (PM) 
Ministers 
   Majilis  
(107 members) 
 
                                               Multi-ethnic Population of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
 Akims (heads of regions) 
Head of the 
Administration  
State 
Secretary 
Security 
Council 
 11 
References 
Abdykarimov, O. 2006. ‘The State Commission on Democratic Reforms’.  Statement by Secretary of State 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan at special meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council, Vienna, 26
th
 September. 
Di Nino, C. 2007. ‘Ruling Party sweeps Kazakhstan election, official count shows’ Washington Post, 20th 
August.   
Elgie, R. 2000. ‘Staffing the Summit: France’ in B.Guy Peters, R.A.W. Rhodes and V. Wright (eds.) 
Administering the Summit: Administration of the Core Executive in Developed Countries. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan.  
Ertysbaev, E.K. 2001. ‘Institution of the Presidency as a tool of modernization of post-totalitarian transit 
societies’. Conference Paper, 6th April: Almaty - Kazakhstan. 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK) website: http://www.fco.gov.uk  
Guy Peters, B., Rhodes, R.A.W and Wright, V. (eds.) 2000. Administering the Summit: Administration of 
the Core Executive in Developed Countries. Basingstoke: Macmillan.  
Heywood, A.1997. Politics. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. 2007. Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 
1996-2006. Washington: World Bank. 
 
Majlybaev, B.A. 2001. ‘The evolution of the Institute of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan: 
problems, tendencies and prospects’. Conference Paper, 6th April: Almaty – Kazakhstan. 
 
Nazarbayev, N. 2007a. ‘A new stage in the democratisation of Kazakhstan – the expedited development of 
a free democratic society’. Speech by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the joint 
meeting/session of the chambers of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan 16
th
 May. 
 
Nazarbayev, N. 2007b. ‘Further democratic reform in Kazakhstan is underway’ accessed via 
www.kazakhstan.embassy.org  
 
Nazarbayev, N. 2007c. ‘Kazakhstan deserves to chair OSCE’ Excerpt from interview on Khabar TV’s 
Zhety Kun programme between Fedor Kurepin and President Nazarbayev broadcast on 9
th
 April. 
World Bank 2006. World Development Report 2007: Development and the Next Generation. Washington 
DC: The World  Bank. 
Zhumabayev, Y. 2007. ‘Parliament Approves Constitutional Changes’ Kazakhstan Today 22nd May. 
